Identity-verification methods compared

No identity-verification method is strongest in every circumstance. The right design combines evidence validation, proof that the applicant controls or owns that evidence, fraud controls, and a usable fallback appropriate to the Irish service.

For: Irish product, risk, fraud, privacy and procurement teams. This is independent information, not legal, compliance or security advice.

Comparison

Method	What it contributes	Principal limitation
Document image	Visible and machine-readable evidence	Image quality, forgery and possession are not ownership
NFC chip	Digitally signed chip data and portrait	Device/document support and user friction
Face match	Compares applicant to evidence portrait	Biometric governance, errors and spoofing controls
Data check	Confirms attributes against a source	Access, freshness and population coverage
Manual review	Handles ambiguity and exceptions	Consistency, cost, privacy and queue delay
Reusable credential	Presents previously verified signed attributes	Issuer trust, status, wallet availability and fallback

Validation is not verification

Checking that a passport appears genuine validates evidence. Establishing that the applicant is its legitimate holder verifies ownership. A complete process also resolves attributes to an identity, binds the resulting account and supports correction or redress.

Choose by failure consequence

• Low-consequence access may require little or no identity proofing.
• Regulated onboarding may need multiple evidence and ownership controls.
• Age-gated access should disclose only the required age result where possible.
• High-risk recovery may require re-proofing rather than repeating a weak knowledge check.

Minimum comparison questions

• What does the method actually prove?
• Which attacks remain possible?
• Who cannot complete it and what alternative exists?
• What data is created, retained and shared?
• Which independent evidence covers the exact product and configuration?

Evidence and limits

MyID separates enacted rules, official implementation material, testing and vendor claims. A source can establish what its publisher says; it does not prove that every product, deployment or interpretation works as claimed. Where Irish implementation remains unsettled, this page says so.

• NIST SP 800-63A-4 identity proofing
• ENISA Remote Identity Proofing: Attacks and Countermeasures
• European Commission EUDI Wallet Toolbox and ARF

Sources checked 22 August 2026. Re-check the linked primary material before making a consequential decision.

Next useful pages

• Procurement checklist
• Deepfake controls
• Provider directory