EU digital identity: the country evidence
Open the companies and projects explorer
Europe already has national login, signing and identity services. The EU Wallet Tracker follows the new wallet layer across 27 countries, while the Scorecard compares five pillars of published evidence. Read how it is scored; a strong national eID is not itself an EUDI wallet.
What could Ireland learn from how another country organised digital identity? Compare with Ireland, scan all 27 countries or read Ireland's evidence.
A law, an app launch, a procurement and a wallet certificate answer different questions. The Scorecard ranks published evidence, not legal compliance. Coverage varies by country.
Compare with Ireland
The same five questions, with Ireland as your starting point. Evidence gaps do not mean a country has no service.
Read the selected comparison
All 27 countries at a glance
As described in the selected sources, not a live availability or compliance audit. Limited coverage means at least one question needs more evidence. Open a country for sources and uncertainty.
| Country | Existing services | EUDI developments | Public/private model | Last checked |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AustriaLimited coverage | ID Austria and eAusweise; full-function ID Austria provides the eAusweise login. | Current EUDI delivery is not covered by these selected national-service sources. | A-Trust provides signature services; BRZ attributes eAusweise software to Youniqx. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| BelgiumLimited coverage | MyGov.be activation with eID or itsme; the federal login supports several service-specific keys. | Current EUDI delivery is not covered by this national-login evidence. | Accredited itsme is accepted in federal authentication. The investment disclosure is from 2021. | 2026-10-07Selected sources |
| BulgariaSelected evidence | Evrotrust is a notified private eID scheme with documented enrolment routes. | Wallet-law consultation: 6 October to 5 November 2026; not final appointments. | A private provider performs the scheme's identity functions. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| CroatiaLimited coverage | Citizen access is not covered by the selected responsibility decision. | Government responsibilities assigned in September 2025; delivery is not established. | Private participation is not covered by the selected evidence. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| CyprusSelected evidence | Digital Citizen uses verified CYLogin; proofing includes bank, video-call and in-person routes. | A wallet competition is recorded; the portal and original TED notice have different deadlines. | JCC describes bank ownership. Domestic eID links private services and public proofing. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| CzechiaSelected evidence | Identita občana supports government credentials, bank authentication and MojeID. | Certification concept, accreditation methodology and a dated wallet procurement record. | Banks and MojeID participate in the national login federation. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| DenmarkLimited coverage | AltID launched with age and identity credentials in June 2026, alongside MitID rather than replacing it. | The AltID launch and development award do not establish EUDI certification. | Banks participate through Finance Denmark; notices name operating suppliers and an AltID developer. | 2026-10-07Selected sources |
| EstoniaSelected evidence | TARA and GovSSO support ID-card, Mobile-ID, Smart-ID and supported EU eIDs, with eligibility restrictions. | RIA's wallet competitive dialogue is a procurement record, not an award. | Mobile-ID and Smart-ID are accepted methods, not open access to the government gateway for every business. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| FinlandLimited coverage | Current citizen-service availability is not covered by the selected wallet law and announcements. | A December 2026 statutory transition and a government expectation of a 2027 solution remain distinct. | The law permits other providers; a private technical supplier was selected according to DVV's announcement. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| FranceLimited coverage | FranceConnect and FranceConnect+ federate identity providers and services; assurance requirements differ. | The reviewed France Identité certificate is national eID certification, not an EUDI wallet certificate. | The terms describe provider-to-service federation; a complete private-provider inventory is not covered. | 2026-10-07Selected sources |
| GermanyLimited coverage | Current citizen-service availability is not covered by the selected bill and launch announcement. | A January 2027 launch plan and a referred wallet bill, as recorded on 8 October. | Around 40 launch partners were announced, not counted as live connected businesses. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| GreeceLimited coverage | Gov.gr Wallet provides domestic identity and driving-licence documents, not international travel documents. | Cross-border EUDI certification is not established by this domestic-document guidance. | Web banking is one described login route; other issuance conditions still apply. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| HungaryLimited coverage | DÁP terms describe domestic-app enrolment from age 14, with additional conditions. | Domestic roles and app terms do not establish EUDI designation or certification. | A wider private-participation model is not covered by the selected domestic framework sources. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| IrelandSelected evidence | Eligible applicants can use the MyGovID app's SAFE route; the wallet sources describe testing and a controlled beta. | Consultation, testing and a voluntary controlled beta; policy and legislation remain part of the work. | Intended relying-party registration is described, but a production register is not established. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| ItalyLimited coverage | Current citizen access is not established by the selected decree and acquisition disclosure. | Legal roles and certification responsibilities assigned; delivered systems and certificates are separate questions. | Poste's August disclosure reports 49% of PagoPA; IPZS holds 51% and sole control. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| LatviaLimited coverage | Existing citizen services are not covered by the selected wallet instruction. | A commitment to develop and certify by 24 December 2026, not proof of completion. | Private participation is not covered by the selected evidence. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| LithuaniaLimited coverage | Smart-ID's notice describes Mobile-ID and bank-branch registration routes with first-time and repeat-user conditions. | Current EUDI delivery is not covered by this provider enrolment notice. | The provider's enrolment routes involve Mobile-ID or a bank branch, subject to conditions. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| LuxembourgLimited coverage | Citizen-service availability is not covered by the selected shareholder and bill sources. | Bill 8583 is shown as a draft in committee in the reviewed parliamentary record. | Named shareholder interests describe part of the public/private model, not complete ultimate ownership. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| MaltaSelected evidence | Identità describes virtual eID activation; card authentication and signing are separate routes. | Enabling legal powers and a procurement programme, with dated notice-version history. | A wallet competition seeks supply; an awarded supplier is not established. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| NetherlandsSelected evidence | Signicat reports itsme availability and a future iDIN migration plan; NL Wallet trials are not a certified public launch. | Public wallet development and trial use cases; production certification needs separate evidence. | Signicat describes migration between existing private identity services. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| PolandSelected evidence | KIR describes bank-based mojeID and mSzafir signing routes; mObywatel Europa is described as a sandbox app. | A draft wallet bill, an organisational sandbox and certification-programme material, not production certification. | KIR links bank-based mojeID with login.gov.pl and Trusted Profile, and describes signing identity checks. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| PortugalLimited coverage | gov.pt supports CMD login, signing and domestic documents; CGD offers eligible customers CMD or Citizen Card onboarding. | Reported interoperability work in June 2025 is pilot evidence, not production appointments. | CGD describes bank onboarding; SIBS appears in the 2025 pilot report, not as a confirmed production role. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| RomaniaLimited coverage | Current citizen access is not established by the selected project roadmap. | RO Wallet schedules testing, beta and launch milestones extending into January 2027. | Private participation is not covered by the selected evidence. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| SlovakiaSelected evidence | MeID describes passkey login after one-time chip-document proofing; mailbox eligibility differs. | Statutory responsibility, registration and oversight roles; delivered suppliers and certificates are not established. | Provider rules require qualified trust-service status or a contract with a qualified provider; no executed contract is established. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| SloveniaLimited coverage | SPOT accepts state credentials, Rekono, Halcom One and supported EU eIDs through SI-PASS. | Current EUDI delivery is not covered by this business-portal guidance. | Rekono and Halcom One are accepted methods; some submissions still require a digital certificate. | 2026-10-07Selected sources |
| SpainLimited coverage | Cl@ve and DNIe guidance describes national authentication and signing; MiDNI remote rollout remains unconfirmed here. | Wallet-governance hearing through 13 October 2026; historical beta announcements are not current certification. | A current private-participation model is not covered by the selected evidence. | 2026-10-08Selected sources |
| SwedenSelected evidence | BankID's domestic policy describes bank customer proofing and its identity-service arrangements. | Digg's roadmap runs from 2026 testing to a 2029 certified-wallet goal; it does not change EU duties. | Banks own the BankID company and perform customer proofing according to the policy. | 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08Selected sources |
What Irish organisations can learn
Start with the roles, not the app name. Who proves the person's identity? Who issues the credential? Who operates the wallet, registers the relying business and certifies the product? Several countries divide those jobs between public bodies and private firms.
For an Irish buyer, the useful comparison is the route into a service: onboarding, accepted credentials, trust checks and fallback. A familiar bank login or domestic identity app does not, by itself, prove that a supplier can deliver an EUDI wallet integration.
Check Ireland's position, compare the countries below, or use the Irish organisation readiness guide. Our methodology explains the evidence boundaries.
Dates to watch
Spain's wallet-governance hearing runs to 13 October. Bulgaria's wallet-law consultation runs to 5 November. Both official notices were refreshed on 8 October. France's reviewed national identity decision states validity to 15 October; a subsequent renewal is not established here.
Procurement dates and parliamentary stages below are dated records. Check the linked official portal before submitting a bid or relying on a legal status. Forecasts remain forecasts, even after a planned date passes.
Country questions and supporting reference
Austria
Austria connects a state identity service with public infrastructure and private signing technology.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
ID Austria and eAusweise; full-function ID Austria provides the eAusweise login.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
The Chancellery's notices name BRZ for processing and hosting; BRZ describes platform operation.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- How do private firms participate?
A-Trust provides signature services; BRZ attributes eAusweise software to Youniqx.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What is happening on EUDI?
Current EUDI delivery is not covered by these selected national-service sources.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What remains uncertain?
The app notices and supplier descriptions establish specific roles. They do not establish a complete current ownership map or an EUDI wallet certificate.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland make service accreditation, activation and attribute permissions easier to distinguish?
Read the detailed evidence for Austria (4 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
ID Austria's app notice names the Federal Chancellery as controller, BRZ for processing and hosting, and A-Trust for signature services.
These are app-specific privacy roles, not a complete national responsibility map.
Read the primary sources
- Datenschutzerklärung der App „ID Austria“
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The national service-provider process separates checks, accreditation and activation: BRZ checks submitted information, the Interior Ministry accredits the service, and the service owner activates it. Extra attribute permissions require ministry review.
This is ID Austria onboarding, not the EUDI relying-party registration process.
Read the primary sources
- Registrierung
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The eAusweise privacy notice names the Federal Chancellery as app controller and BRZ as the processing and storage location. Individual digital credentials have separate notices.
The app notice does not allocate every issuer's or verifier's responsibilities.
Read the primary sources
- Datenschutzerklärung: App eAusweise
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
BRZ says it operates the identity-document platform, that eAusweise uses Youniqx software, and that full-function ID Austria is used to sign in.
This is the platform operator's description, not a new contract, ownership audit or wallet certificate.
Read the primary sources
- BRZ Ausweisplattform
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The app notices and supplier descriptions establish specific roles. They do not establish a complete current ownership map or an EUDI wallet certificate.
Belgium
Belgium lets people use state and private credentials to enter its national digital services.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
MyGov.be activation with eID or itsme; the federal login supports several service-specific keys.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- Who operates it?
The reviewed federal service guidance explains accepted keys; a full operator map is not covered.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Accredited itsme is accepted in federal authentication. The investment disclosure is from 2021.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What is happening on EUDI?
Current EUDI delivery is not covered by this national-login evidence.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What remains uncertain?
Activation and login are separate from access rights. The itsme investment below is historical, not a current ownership register.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland separate an accepted login method from a person's right to access a service?
Read the detailed evidence for Belgium (3 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
MyGov.be can be activated with a Belgian eID or an active itsme account.
Activation alone does not establish eligibility for every service or EUDI certification.
Read the primary sources
- Welcome - MyGov.be
Source checked 2026-10-07.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Belgium's Federal Authentication Service supports several keys, including eID, MyGov.be, accredited itsme and supported EU eIDs. Each relying service chooses its supported keys and assurance level; separate access rights can still apply.
A successful login is not automatic permission to use a service.
Read the primary sources
- FAS - Terms of Use | Help Centre
Source checked 2026-10-07.
Historical record · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
itsme reported a €14.5 million investment by FPIM/SFPI and a 20% stake in February 2021.
This is the company's historical announcement, not its 2026 ownership position.
Read the primary sources
- itsme® raises €24.7 million to finance ambitious growth plans
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: Activation and login are separate from access rights. The itsme investment below is historical, not a current ownership register.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria has a notified private identity scheme and a wallet-law consultation.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
Evrotrust is a notified private eID scheme with documented enrolment routes.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- Who operates it?
The scheme names Evrotrust Technologies AD for registration, issuance and authentication.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
A private provider performs the scheme's identity functions.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Wallet-law consultation: 6 October to 5 November 2026; not final appointments.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
The assurance-level records disagree on Low assurance. The reviewed draft notice does not settle final wallet appointments.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3
Question for Ireland: How would Ireland explain the difference between a notified private eID and a wallet provider?
Read the detailed evidence for Bulgaria (3 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The Official Journal list published on 12 August 2026 records Bulgaria's Evrotrust eID at Substantial and High assurance, notified on 5 July 2023. The reviewed Commission overview also lists Low assurance.
The difference remains unexplained. It is not evidence of a downgrade or that every account has High assurance.
Read the primary sources
- EUR-Lex - 52026XC04428 - EN - EUR-Lex
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Overview of pre-notified and notified eID schemes under eIDAS - eID User Community -
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The notified scheme names Evrotrust Technologies AD for registration, issuance and authentication. Its Substantial route uses remote biometric enrolment; its High route requires face-to-face enrolment and PIN authentication for issuance and activation.
This describes the notified 2023 design, not every current account or an EUDI wallet certificate.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: ec.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Consultation
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Bulgaria's official notice opens consultation on its wallet-law proposal from 6 October to 5 November 2026, under reference 12780-K.
The notice was refreshed on 8 October. Final wallet, identity-data and registrar appointments are not established by this landing page.
Read the primary sources
- [Срок: 05.11.2026] Закон за Европейския портфейл за цифрова самоличност
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The assurance-level records disagree on Low assurance. The reviewed draft notice does not settle final wallet appointments.
Croatia
Croatia has assigned wallet construction and issuance responsibilities in a government decision.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Citizen access is not covered by the selected responsibility decision.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- Who operates it?
The decision assigns construction to AKD and implementation and issuance to the ministry.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Private participation is not covered by the selected evidence.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What is happening on EUDI?
Government responsibilities assigned in September 2025; delivery is not established.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
An assigned responsibility is not evidence that the wallet, integrations or certification have been delivered.
Evidence 1
Question for Ireland: How would Ireland distinguish an assigned delivery role from a working service?
Read the detailed evidence for Croatia (1 items)
EUDI development · National measure
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
A September 2025 government decision assigns AKD wallet construction, the ministry implementation and issuance after construction, and infrastructure and trust-register work to named public bodies.
These are mandates, not completed integrations, an award or certification.
Read the primary sources
- Odluka o provedbi Uredbe (EU) 2024/1183 o uspostavi europskog okvira za digitalni identitet
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: An assigned responsibility is not evidence that the wallet, integrations or certification have been delivered.
Cyprus
Cyprus combines government accounts, bank-backed identity services and public identity-proofing centres.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
Digital Citizen uses verified CYLogin; proofing includes bank, video-call and in-person routes.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
Government guidance names JCC Payment Systems for domestic eID, with public proofing centres.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
JCC describes bank ownership. Domestic eID links private services and public proofing.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What is happening on EUDI?
A wallet competition is recorded; the portal and original TED notice have different deadlines.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
Its wallet tender has conflicting published deadline records. The named domestic eID provider should not be treated as the wallet contractor.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland offer clearly explained remote and in-person proofing routes without confusing eID and wallet suppliers?
Read the detailed evidence for Cyprus (4 items)
EUDI development · Procurement
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The Cyprus procurement portal checked on 8 October lists 13 November 2026 at 11:00 for submission. The original 4 September TED notice printed 13 October at 11:00 UTC+03. The competition names the Deputy Ministry as buyer, with an estimated €9,778,000 value and a 60-month duration.
The amendment and portal timezone are not established. These are dated records, not a confirmed current deadline, award or expenditure; the €500,000 option treatment is unresolved.
Read the primary sources
- eProcurement - Επισκόπηση Διαγωνισμού
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Primary document: ted.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Digital Citizen guidance requires a verified CYLogin account with two-factor authentication. Proofing options include a bank, a Citizen Service Centre video call or an in-person visit.
This is published domestic guidance, not a tested customer journey or EUDI certification.
Read the primary sources
- Εγγραφή Χρήστη - Ψηφιακός Πολίτης - Gov.cy
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Government eID guidance names JCC Payment Systems as the approved domestic provider. It links an online application with physical proofing at public Citizen Service Centres. Other guidance describes CYLogin authentication through JCC Authenticator and signing through JCC's portal.
These links do not identify the wallet contractor or prove every account's qualification.
Read the primary sources
- Πως μπορώ να αποκτήσω eID; - Ηλεκτρονική Ταυτότητα (eID) - Gov.cy
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Τρόποι χρήσης eID - Ηλεκτρονική Ταυτότητα (eID) - Gov.cy
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
JCC says it is owned by Cyprus commercial banks, with Bank of Cyprus holding a controlling interest. It also names Eurobank, Alpha Bank Cyprus, National Bank of Greece (Cyprus) and Astrobank.
This is the company's disclosure. Shareholding percentages and registry reconciliation are not established.
Read the primary sources
- Board of Directors and company ownership - JCC Payment Systems Ltd
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: Its wallet tender has conflicting published deadline records. The named domestic eID provider should not be treated as the wallet contractor.
Czechia
Czechia has a national login federation, a wallet certification concept and procurement work.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
Identita občana supports government credentials, bank authentication and MojeID.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
DIA publishes wallet certification concepts and procurement material; a complete live operator map is not covered.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
Banks and MojeID participate in the national login federation.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Certification concept, accreditation methodology and a dated wallet procurement record.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- What remains uncertain?
The certification concept is not a final scheme or an issued certificate. The procurement status below is a dated portal observation, not an invitation to bid.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland let people see disclosure consents and authentication history across accepted identity methods?
Read the detailed evidence for Czechia (4 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Identita občana supports government credentials, bank authentication and MojeID. Users can review disclosure consents and activity history.
This is the national federation, not evidence of certified EUDI delivery.
Read the primary sources
- Jak na Identitu občana | Identita občana
Source checked 2026-10-07.
EUDI development · Draft
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
DIA publishes a first public concept for the Czech wallet certification scheme. Its 1 October 2026 package includes EUDIW-CZ version 1.2, covering wallet-provider, identity-data-provider and overarching certification. It describes DIA's future identity-data role under proposed legislation.
The concept is not a final designation or issued certificate. Its June standards baseline and expected update should not be treated as a current technical specification.
Read the primary sources
- Národní certifikační schéma EUDIW | DIA
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
ČIA's September change sheet 9/26 adds wallet certification to accreditation methodology MPA 40-01-26 version 2, with commencement on 1 November 2026.
A methodology start date is not accreditation of a named assessment body or certification of a wallet.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: www.cai.cz
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Procurement
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The NEN portal checked on 8 October labels DIA procedure N006/25/V00006605 as not terminated and gives a participation deadline of 25 June 2025 at 11:00. It describes a competitive-dialogue client-wallet service with revisable assumptions.
The status may lag. It does not mean bidding is open or establish a winner, concession or actual supplier appointment.
Read the primary sources
- KLIENTSKÁ ČÁST EVROPSKÉ PENĚŽENKY DIGITÁLNÍ IDENTITY (EUDIW) | National electronic tool
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The certification concept is not a final scheme or an issued certificate. The procurement status below is a dated portal observation, not an invitation to bid.
Denmark
Denmark's new AltID app sits alongside MitID, its joint state-and-bank identity service.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
AltID launched with age and identity credentials in June 2026, alongside MitID rather than replacing it.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
MitID describes a state-and-bank partnership; NemLog-in notices separate application and infrastructure operations.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
Banks participate through Finance Denmark; notices name operating suppliers and an AltID developer.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- What is happening on EUDI?
The AltID launch and development award do not establish EUDI certification.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What remains uncertain?
The domestic app launch and announced development award do not establish EUDI wallet certification.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland keep the existing login service and new credential app understandable as separate layers?
Read the detailed evidence for Denmark (4 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
MitID describes a joint partnership between the Danish Agency for Digital Government, representing public authorities, and Finance Denmark, representing banks.
That is MitID governance, not ownership of AltID or wallet certification.
Read the primary sources
- About MitID - MitID
Source checked 2026-10-07.
National service · Procurement
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The agency's 2026 NemLog-in retender notices describe existing application operations with Nets/IN Groupe to January 2028 and infrastructure operations with NNIT/Aevento to March 2029.
Those notices describe existing arrangements and new procurement, not awards of replacement contracts.
Read the primary sources
- NemLog-in-løsningen sendes i udbud
Source checked 2026-10-07.
- Drift af NemLog-in sendes i udbud
Source checked 2026-10-07.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
AltID became available to download on 3 June 2026, initially with age and identity credentials. It uses MitID and does not replace it.
A domestic app launch does not establish EUDI wallet certification.
Read the primary sources
- Nu kan du downloade AltID
Source checked 2026-10-07.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
In April 2025, the agency announced a DKK29 million AltID development contract with Nine.
The development award does not identify every operating supplier or prove delivery acceptance.
Read the primary sources
- New digital identity wallet in development
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: The domestic app launch and announced development award do not establish EUDI wallet certification.
Estonia
Estonia brings state credentials and private Mobile-ID and Smart-ID services into government login.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
TARA and GovSSO support ID-card, Mobile-ID, Smart-ID and supported EU eIDs, with eligibility restrictions.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
RIA's government gateways accept multiple identity methods; business onboarding is restricted.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Mobile-ID and Smart-ID are accepted methods, not open access to the government gateway for every business.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
RIA's wallet competitive dialogue is a procurement record, not an award.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
Those government gateways are not open to every private business. The wallet competition is evidence of procurement, not an award.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland publish an equally clear distinction between accepted credentials and eligible relying services?
Read the detailed evidence for Estonia (2 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
RIA's TARA and GovSSO support ID-card, Mobile-ID, Smart-ID and supported notified EU eIDs. Smart-ID+ support was added on 26 February 2026. Government-service onboarding is restricted, not open to any private organisation.
GovSSO's Mobile-ID and Smart-ID routes require an Estonian personal code. A Smart-ID credential alone does not establish residency.
Read the primary sources
- Authentication services | RIA
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Procurement
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
TED notice 337933-2026, published on 18 May, records RIA's wallet competitive dialogue: development followed by a five-year service-provider phase. It estimates €21.65 million excluding VAT and an overall duration of 96 months.
This is a dated competition, not an award or money spent. The overall duration and operating phase are different measures.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: ted.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: Those government gateways are not open to every private business. The wallet competition is evidence of procurement, not an award.
Finland
Finland's law names a wallet-provider role for DVV, while the government expects the solution in 2027.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Current citizen-service availability is not covered by the selected wallet law and announcements.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- Who operates it?
The law assigns DVV wallet provision; DVV announced Scytáles for technical solutions.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
The law permits other providers; a private technical supplier was selected according to DVV's announcement.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What is happening on EUDI?
A December 2026 statutory transition and a government expectation of a 2027 solution remain distinct.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What remains uncertain?
The December 2026 statutory transition and the 2027 announcement remain distinct. We do not conclude that the later plan changes the law or establishes a breach.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3
Question for Ireland: How should Ireland explain legal responsibilities separately from a supplier selection and launch forecast?
Read the detailed evidence for Finland (3 items)
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Section 7 of Finland's Act 810/2026 assigns DVV wallet provision, permits other providers and sets notification requirements before provision. Section 53 includes DVV's wallet-provider function in the transition list dated 24 December 2026.
That is operative wording, not proof of a delivered wallet or a compliance finding.
Read the primary sources
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The Finnish Government's 30 September announcement says the enabling legislation takes effect on 1 October and the wallet and digital-identification solution are expected in 2027. The responsible agencies will announce the launch later.
The announcement does not explain a qualifying restricted 2026 release or amend the statutory obligations.
Read the primary sources
- Legislation on European Digital Identity Wallets enters into force in October - Finnish Government
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
DVV announced the selection of Scytáles AB for Suomi.fi Wallet technical solutions on 2 July 2026, with publication planned for 2027.
A selection announcement is not a signed-contract or production-acceptance receipt. The timing question above remains open.
Read the primary sources
What remains open: The December 2026 statutory transition and the 2027 announcement remain distinct. We do not conclude that the later plan changes the law or establishes a breach.
France
France uses an identity federation and a separately certified national identity credential.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
FranceConnect and FranceConnect+ federate identity providers and services; assurance requirements differ.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
The federation terms identify DINUM as operator.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
The terms describe provider-to-service federation; a complete private-provider inventory is not covered.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
The reviewed France Identité certificate is national eID certification, not an EUDI wallet certificate.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
The reviewed France Identité decision states an expiry of 15 October 2026. A later renewal is not established here, and national eID certification is not EUDI wallet certification.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland explain which assurance level each service needs without implying one certificate covers everything?
Read the detailed evidence for France (2 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
ANSSI decision 3138, dated 25 June 2026, certifies France Identité's national electronic-identification means at High assurance until 15 October 2026, subject to its use conditions. Authentication must use a qualifying Android or iOS France Identité app under its separate qualification conditions.
This is national eID certification under Article 8, not an EUDI wallet certificate. The catalogue refreshed on 8 October is dated 15 September and lists the same expiry; no subsequent renewal is established. Its separate recommendation status is not interpreted as revocation.
Read the primary sources
- France Identité decision3138 of25June2026
Source checked 2026-10-07.
- ANSSI certification catalogue, September 2026
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
FranceConnect and FranceConnect+ terms, applicable from 20 February 2026, identify DINUM as operator. The federation links identity providers with online services. FranceConnect supports Low assurance; FranceConnect+ supports Substantial or High, chosen by the relying service.
These national federation terms do not designate an EUDI provider or certify every participating private service.
Read the primary sources
- Conditions générales d’utilisation - FranceConnect
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: The reviewed France Identité decision states an expiry of 15 October 2026. A later renewal is not established here, and national eID certification is not EUDI wallet certification.
Germany
Germany has announced d-you for January 2027 and is progressing its wallet legislation.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Current citizen-service availability is not covered by the selected bill and launch announcement.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- Who operates it?
BMDS announced d-you; final operational roles are not established by the selected material.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
Around 40 launch partners were announced, not counted as live connected businesses.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
A January 2027 launch plan and a referred wallet bill, as recorded on 8 October.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What remains uncertain?
Planned launch partners are not live users or connected businesses. The parliamentary status is a dated observation, not a complete legal search.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2
Question for Ireland: How would Ireland distinguish signed-up launch partners from live, usable integrations?
Read the detailed evidence for Germany (2 items)
EUDI development · Draft
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The Bundestag's DIP record checked on 8 October marks the DIdG bill as referred. It records bill 21/7408 dated 29 July and a first reading on 23 September.
This is a parliamentary snapshot. Draft assignments are not enacted roles, and the record is not an exhaustive finding that no later law exists.
Read the primary sources
- DIP
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
BMDS announced d-you on 9 September 2026, with a planned launch on 2 January 2027 and around 40 launch partners.
Those are plans, not live relying-party counts, certification or proof of complete functionality.
Read the primary sources
- d-you: Deutschland startet digitale Identität für alle
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: Planned launch partners are not live users or connected businesses. The parliamentary status is a dated observation, not a complete legal search.
Greece
Greece's Gov.gr Wallet provides domestic digital documents and uses established login routes.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Gov.gr Wallet provides domestic identity and driving-licence documents, not international travel documents.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
The guidance describes login and phone-proofing requirements; a full operator map is not covered.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Web banking is one described login route; other issuance conditions still apply.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Cross-border EUDI certification is not established by this domestic-document guidance.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
These documents are not international travel documents. Domestic legal use does not establish cross-border EUDI certification.
Evidence 1
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland state clearly where a digital document can and cannot be used?
Read the detailed evidence for Greece (1 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Gov.gr Wallet describes digital identity and driving-licence documents for legal use within Greece, not international travel. Login routes include TaxisNet with a verified mobile number or web banking; document issuance also requires a certified EMEp phone number.
Domestic documents and bank-login routes are not proof of cross-border EUDI certification.
Read the primary sources
- Gov.gr Wallet
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: These documents are not international travel documents. Domestic legal use does not establish cross-border EUDI certification.
Hungary
Hungary's digital-citizenship framework assigns app and supporting-service roles to IdomSoft and NISZ.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
DÁP terms describe domestic-app enrolment from age 14, with additional conditions.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
The decree assigns IdomSoft the framework app and NISZ specified supporting functions.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
A wider private-participation model is not covered by the selected domestic framework sources.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What is happening on EUDI?
Domestic roles and app terms do not establish EUDI designation or certification.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What remains uncertain?
The domestic app's enrolment terms and statutory roles do not establish EUDI provider designation or certification.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland publish a plain-language responsibility map for the app and its supporting services?
Read the detailed evidence for Hungary (2 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
DÁP's domestic-app terms, effective from 30 July 2026, set an age threshold of 14 or older and describe remote identification, chip-ID/PIN and preregistration activation routes.
Other enrolment conditions still apply. These terms do not establish signing eligibility or EUDI availability.
Read the primary sources
- Általános Szerződési Feltételek - Digitális Állampolgárság Program (DÁP)
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · National measure
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Decree 320/2024, consolidated from 1 October 2026, designates IdomSoft for digital citizenship and its framework app. It assigns NISZ supporting e-signature, e-post and identity-data and attribute-issuance functions for the national document wallet.
These are domestic framework roles, not proof of EUDI provider designation, registration or certification.
Read the primary sources
- 320/2024. (XI. 6.) Korm. rendelet - Nemzeti Jogszabálytár
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The domestic app's enrolment terms and statutory roles do not establish EUDI provider designation or certification.
Ireland
Ireland's Government Digital Wallet remains described in the reviewed sources as testing and a controlled beta, with policy, delivery and credential roles split across public bodies.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
Eligible applicants can use the MyGovID app's SAFE route; the wallet sources describe testing and a controlled beta.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- Who operates it?
The FAQ assigns policy to DCCS, delivery and support to OGCIO, and MyGovID ownership to DSP.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Intended relying-party registration is described, but a production register is not established.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Consultation, testing and a voluntary controlled beta; policy and legislation remain part of the work.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- What remains uncertain?
The wallet FAQ's in-person SAFE wording and the separate online MyGovID route do not settle trial eligibility. Organisations should not assume a production relying-party register exists from a pilot screen.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4 · Evidence 5 · Evidence 6
Question for Ireland: When comparing countries, ask how existing identity, wallet delivery and business access are kept distinct.
Read the detailed evidence for Ireland (6 items)
EUDI development · Testing
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Ireland's wallet FAQ describes consultation and testing, with legislation needed before use at scale. It gives DCCS the policy role, OGCIO operational delivery and support, and DSP ownership of MyGovID.
These are programme descriptions, not final statutory appointments or an issued certificate.
Read the primary sources
- Government Digital Wallet: Your questions answered
Source checked 2026-10-07.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
DSP's MyGovID app guidance lets eligible applicants complete SAFE registration online using an Irish passport book, an NFC-capable phone and biometric checks, subject to officer approval. An in-person fallback remains available.
This establishes a MyGovID and PSC route, not eligibility for the wallet trial. Its retention period is not a wallet rule.
Read the primary sources
- MyGovID app
Source checked 2026-10-07.
EUDI development · Pilot
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The wallet privacy notice dated 22 May 2026 covers a voluntary, controlled beta. It names DPER/OGCIO as controller for app operation and onboarding, and processor for facilitated credential issuance and verification. DSP controls issuance data for the beta's anchor credential.
These are the beta notice's allocations, not final EUDI designations or independent GDPR clearance.
Read the primary sources
- Government Digital Wallet: Data privacy notice
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Pilot
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The beta notice separates locally held credentials and activity history from onboarding records. It says onboarding data is kept for participation plus approximately three months of wind-down, and DPER/OGCIO does not retain copies of issued credentials or verification results.
Separate issuer and web-verifier notices apply. This is not a promise that all government data is deleted after three months, or a universal analytics-retention rule.
Read the primary sources
- Government Digital Wallet: Data privacy notice
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Testing
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Government interoperability guidance dated 23 July describes intended relying-party registration and says national policy is being defined. The public web-verifier landing page checked on 8 October labels its scenarios as pilot or test.
Neither source establishes a live production register or issuance of relying-party certificates.
Read the primary sources
- Government Digital Wallet: Interoperability
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Government Digital Wallet Web Verifier
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The FAQ describes voluntary wallet use, existing identification methods and alternative channels under a digital-first, not digital-only policy. Each integrated service provider must consider how to avoid disadvantaging non-users.
That is published policy, not an audit of any provider's implementation.
Read the primary sources
- Government Digital Wallet: Your questions answered
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The wallet FAQ's in-person SAFE wording and the separate online MyGovID route do not settle trial eligibility. Organisations should not assume a production relying-party register exists from a pilot screen.
Italy
Italy's decree names PagoPA as wallet provider and divides identity, registration and certification responsibilities among public bodies.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Current citizen access is not established by the selected decree and acquisition disclosure.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- Who operates it?
The decree names PagoPA for the wallet, AgID for oversight and registration, and IPZS for specified infrastructure.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
Poste's August disclosure reports 49% of PagoPA; IPZS holds 51% and sole control.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Legal roles and certification responsibilities assigned; delivered systems and certificates are separate questions.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- What remains uncertain?
Those legal assignments do not prove live systems or an issued wallet certificate. The acquisition figures are a dated disclosure by a party to the transaction.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4 · Evidence 5
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland distinguish ownership, operational delivery and certification responsibility in one clear register?
Read the detailed evidence for Italy (5 items)
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Article 3 of the decree dated 31 July 2026 designates PagoPA as wallet provider, evolving public IT-Wallet. AgID receives supervision, single-contact and relying-party-register functions; IPZS supplies the register's technical infrastructure.
The decree does not prove a live register, delivered systems or certification, and does not establish universal exclusion of private wallets.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: www.gazzettaufficiale.it
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The decree assigns IPZS identity-data association with wallets, public-source attribute attestations and relying-party access and registration certificates. It separately provides for technical certificates under AgID arrangements.
Technical certificates are not wallet conformity certificates. The public-source roles are not a monopoly over every private attestation.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: www.gazzettaufficiale.it
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
ACN and AgID own the cybersecurity and functional certification components respectively. ACCREDIA accredits assessment bodies. ACN issues cybersecurity certificates through OCSI; AgID attests functional-certificate issuance by accredited bodies and communicates certified-wallet information for EU listing.
A legal framework is not an issued certificate. The adequacy of transitional arrangements is not assessed here.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: www.gazzettaufficiale.it
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Primary document: www.gazzettaufficiale.it
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Article 8 makes the decree effective on publication in the Gazette, on 10 September 2026.
This establishes the original instrument's start date, not a complete subsequent-amendment or implementation audit.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: www.gazzettaufficiale.it
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Poste's 5 August 2026 announcement says IPZS and Poste completed the PagoPA acquisition with 51% and 49% respectively, with IPZS exercising sole control. It describes IPZS as wholly owned by the economy ministry.
This is a direct party's dated disclosure, not an independently inspected company register or certification.
Read the primary sources
What remains open: Those legal assignments do not prove live systems or an issued wallet certificate. The acquisition figures are a dated disclosure by a party to the transaction.
Latvia
Latvia has instructed VDAA to develop and certify its national wallet by 24 December 2026.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Existing citizen services are not covered by the selected wallet instruction.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- Who operates it?
The Cabinet instruction names VDAA for national wallet development and certification.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Private participation is not covered by the selected evidence.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What is happening on EUDI?
A commitment to develop and certify by 24 December 2026, not proof of completion.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
The instruction is evidence of a delivery commitment, not evidence that certification or public access has been completed.
Evidence 1
Question for Ireland: What evidence would Ireland publish to show that a delivery commitment has actually been fulfilled?
Read the detailed evidence for Latvia (1 items)
EUDI development · National measure
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Latvia's Cabinet protocol of 26 May 2026 instructs VDAA to develop and certify a national wallet by 24 December 2026.
The instruction is not a completed wallet or certificate. Detailed roles in the underlying report are not established here.
Read the primary sources
- Ministru kabineta sēdes protokols
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The instruction is evidence of a delivery commitment, not evidence that certification or public access has been completed.
Lithuania
Lithuania's Smart-ID registration options changed on 1 October 2026.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Smart-ID's notice describes Mobile-ID and bank-branch registration routes with first-time and repeat-user conditions.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
Smart-ID publishes the registration policy; a complete state/private operator map is not covered.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
The provider's enrolment routes involve Mobile-ID or a bank branch, subject to conditions.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Current EUDI delivery is not covered by this provider enrolment notice.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What remains uncertain?
This is a provider enrolment change. It is not a change to state notification or proof of an EUDI wallet launch.
Evidence 1
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland explain registration changes without suggesting existing accounts have stopped working?
Read the detailed evidence for Lithuania (1 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Smart-ID's Lithuanian notice says registration with an ID card and card reader ended on 1 October 2026 for first and repeat accounts. First-time options include Mobile-ID or a bank branch; returning-user alternatives have extra conditions.
Existing accounts do not require immediate action solely because of this change. This is provider policy, not EUDI certification.
Read the primary sources
- Keičiasi „Smart-ID“ registracijos tvarka: ką svarbu žinoti? - Smart-ID
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: This is a provider enrolment change. It is not a change to state notification or proof of an EUDI wallet launch.
Luxembourg
Luxembourg combines a public-private trust-service company with wallet legislation still shown in committee.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Citizen-service availability is not covered by the selected shareholder and bill sources.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- Who operates it?
LuxTrust names POST Luxembourg and LuxTrust Development as shareholders; full operating roles are not covered.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Named shareholder interests describe part of the public/private model, not complete ultimate ownership.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Bill 8583 is shown as a draft in committee in the reviewed parliamentary record.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
The shareholder pages identify named interests, not a complete ultimate-ownership audit. Draft institutional roles should not be reported as enacted.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland separate a public/private ownership description from the legal roles in a wallet bill?
Read the detailed evidence for Luxembourg (2 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
LuxTrust names POST Luxembourg and LuxTrust Development as shareholders. POST's subsidiary page reports a 50% interest in LuxTrust.
The reviewed pages do not establish complete ultimate ownership or qualification of every service.
Read the primary sources
- Who we are | LuxTrust S.A.
Source checked 2026-10-07.
- Nos filiales - POSTGroup
Source checked 2026-10-07.
EUDI development · Draft
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Luxembourg's parliamentary dossier 8583, updated on 5 October and checked on 8 October, is labelled a draft bill in committee.
The deposited text's CTIE and ILR roles should not be reported as enacted on this evidence.
Read the primary sources
- Dossier Législatif | Chambre des Députés du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The shareholder pages identify named interests, not a complete ultimate-ownership audit. Draft institutional roles should not be reported as enacted.
Malta
Malta has existing national eID services, legal wallet powers and a wallet procurement programme.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
Identità describes virtual eID activation; card authentication and signing are separate routes.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
MDIA describes wallet programme responsibility; MITA describes existing eIDAS Node infrastructure.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
A wallet competition seeks supply; an awarded supplier is not established.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Enabling legal powers and a procurement programme, with dated notice-version history.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What remains uncertain?
The tender dates are notice-version history, not a guarantee that the latest deadline remains open. Programme responsibility and enabling powers do not establish a delivered certified wallet.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4 · Evidence 5
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland make programme ownership, infrastructure integration and procurement status easier to separate?
Read the detailed evidence for Malta (5 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Identità describes a virtual eID application using a valid Maltese identity or residence document, identity verification and emailed activation. Card-based authentication and signing certificates are a separate, service-specific route.
The reviewed source does not establish a 14-plus threshold or EUDI wallet certification.
Read the primary sources
- Identity Cards Unit Sec Page - eID Virtual Account - Identità
Source checked 2026-10-07.
EUDI development · Procurement
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
TED version 05 for CT2274/2026 names the Department of Contracts as buyer for the MDIA wallet competition, estimates €15,659,714 excluding VAT and prints a submission date of 2 December 2026. Earlier versions printed 3 September, 24 September, 15 October and 5 November.
These are dated notice versions, not a guaranteed current deadline, award or expenditure. The printed UTC+02 and 138-month tender-validity metadata have not been corrected by inference.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: ted.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Primary document: ted.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Primary document: ted.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Primary document: ted.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-08.
- Primary document: ted.europa.eu
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · National measure
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Article 6(3)(l)–(m) of Cap 591 gives MDIA powers to own, manage, develop and provide wallets, and procure goods or services for its functions.
Enabling powers do not appoint a certified production operator or establish a procurement outcome.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: legislation.mt
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
MDIA's 13 July announcement says it leads wallet implementation and will be responsible for the solution and supporting systems.
This is future programme responsibility. Its stated 24 September tender closing date was superseded by later TED notice versions.
Read the primary sources
- Tender issued for the implementation of the European Digital Identity Wallet - MDIA
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
MITA describes the existing eIDAS Node as cross-border authentication infrastructure and provides integration information.
The node does not establish wallet hosting, identity-data-provider designation or independently tested wallet interoperability.
Read the primary sources
- eIDAS - Mita
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The tender dates are notice-version history, not a guarantee that the latest deadline remains open. Programme responsibility and enabling powers do not establish a delivered certified wallet.
Netherlands
The Netherlands is developing a public wallet while private identity providers plan changes to existing bank-login services.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
Signicat reports itsme availability and a future iDIN migration plan; NL Wallet trials are not a certified public launch.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- Who operates it?
The interior ministry commissions public NL Wallet development; the selected notice describes Signicat's service plans.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
Signicat describes migration between existing private identity services.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Public wallet development and trial use cases; production certification needs separate evidence.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
The iDIN migration dates are a provider's plan. They do not prove completed migration or a universal national shutdown.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2
Question for Ireland: How would Ireland protect continuity when existing identity identifiers and services change?
Read the detailed evidence for Netherlands (2 items)
EUDI development · Testing
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The ministry of the interior commissions public NL Wallet development. Official guidance describes voluntary use and continued alternative channels; trial use cases are not a certified public launch.
Production-provider status, current code version, legislative commencement and certification need separate evidence.
Read the primary sources
- De EDI-wallet Identiteit - Digitale Overheid
Source checked 2026-10-07.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Signicat's 3 June 2026 notice offers itsme from 1 June and plans migration from iDIN during June to December 2027, with standalone iDIN ending on 31 December 2027.
This is the provider's migration schedule, not measured completion or a universal shutdown. Old and new identifiers should not be assumed identical.
Read the primary sources
- The Future of Digital Identity: The Transition… - Signicat
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The iDIN migration dates are a provider's plan. They do not prove completed migration or a universal national shutdown.
Poland
Poland's wallet bill is recorded as a draft, alongside existing bank-based identity and signing services.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
KIR describes bank-based mojeID and mSzafir signing routes; mObywatel Europa is described as a sandbox app.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- Who operates it?
KIR describes the national services; COI announces the sandbox; the ministry names certification-programme ownership.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- How do private firms participate?
KIR links bank-based mojeID with login.gov.pl and Trusted Profile, and describes signing identity checks.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What is happening on EUDI?
A draft wallet bill, an organisational sandbox and certification-programme material, not production certification.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- What remains uncertain?
The sandbox is a test environment, not a production register or certification programme. Draft legal roles remain draft.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4 · Evidence 5
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland explain how bank proofing connects to public login while keeping the wallet sandbox visibly separate?
Read the detailed evidence for Poland (5 items)
EUDI development · Draft
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The RCL overview checked on 8 October lists UC122 as open. Its Standing Committee stage bears a modification date of 7 October.
This is draft-stage activity, not final adoption or operative appointments. Later headings and attached draft articles do not establish further progression.
Read the primary sources
- Projekt
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Testing
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
COI's 17 September announcement describes a free organisational sandbox running from 16 September. Approved participants receive a demonstration mObywatel Europa app, test identity data and a web verifier.
This is an announced sandbox, not general citizen access, a production relying-party register or a wallet certificate.
Read the primary sources
- COI i Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji uruchomiły Sandbox Europejskiego Portfela Tożsamości Cyfrowej | COI
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The ministry's 4 August landing page names the Minister of Digital Affairs as owner of the national certification programme and links its archive.
The archive's internal version, annexes and approval signatures have not been reviewed. The landing page does not establish an accredited body or issued wallet certificate.
Read the primary sources
- System certyfikacji. Krajowy program certyfikacji - Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji - Portal Gov.pl
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
KIR describes mojeID bank-based identity verification linked to login.gov.pl and Trusted Profile for public services.
This is a supplier description, not measured adoption, a tested bank flow or EUDI wallet status.
Read the primary sources
- Our products \ Public sector \ Identity and e-signature \ mojeID \ KIR
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
KIR markets mSzafir as qualified signing and describes remote identity confirmation through mojeID or mObywatel.
This is an attributed product description. Current service-level trust-list validation, a legal-effect guarantee and qualification of every KIR product are not established.
Read the primary sources
- Nasza oferta \ Klient indywidualny \ Identyfikacja i e-podpis \ mSzafir \ KIR
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The sandbox is a test environment, not a production register or certification programme. Draft legal roles remain draft.
Portugal
Portugal connects its government app and CMD identity service with domestic documents and bank onboarding.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
gov.pt supports CMD login, signing and domestic documents; CGD offers eligible customers CMD or Citizen Card onboarding.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- Who operates it?
The app page names ARTE as developer; historical pilot reporting names AMA, IRN and SIBS in specific roles.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
CGD describes bank onboarding; SIBS appears in the 2025 pilot report, not as a confirmed production role.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What is happening on EUDI?
Reported interoperability work in June 2025 is pilot evidence, not production appointments.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
Bank eligibility is service-specific. Reported wallet interoperability tests do not establish production roles or count as unique users.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland distinguish reusable national identity in bank onboarding from wallet pilot interoperability?
Read the detailed evidence for Portugal (3 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The gov.pt app page, updated on 19 August 2026, identifies ARTE as developer and describes CMD login, signing and domestic documents. It includes foreign CMD holders and representatives subject to service restrictions. Offline document information is valid for seven days after an online update.
The document equivalence described is domestic. Physical documents are advised abroad; no EUDI certificate is established.
Read the primary sources
- gov.pt
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
CGD offers account opening through CMD or Citizen Card for applicants meeting its conditions, including adult sole holders, a Portuguese Citizen Card and phone, and a Portuguese address and tax residence. Other cases are directed to a branch.
This is one bank's existing integration, not universal foreign eligibility or EUDI readiness.
Read the primary sources
- Abertura de Conta Online
Source checked 2026-10-07.
Historical record · Pilot
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
IRN's report of June 2025 interoperability work in Vilnius names AMA as Portuguese pilot wallet provider and IRN and SIBS as relying parties. It reports IRN's participation in 31 tests.
These are pilot roles and tests, not production appointments or unique users. The SIBS legal entity is unspecified.
Read the primary sources
- IRN participa no evento Potential Interop Vilnius
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: Bank eligibility is service-specific. Reported wallet interoperability tests do not establish production roles or count as unique users.
Romania
Romania's RO Wallet project publishes test, beta and launch milestones extending into January 2027.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Current citizen access is not established by the selected project roadmap.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- Who operates it?
The selected roadmap does not establish a complete operating or supplier model.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- How do private firms participate?
Private participation is not covered by the selected evidence.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What is happening on EUDI?
RO Wallet schedules testing, beta and launch milestones extending into January 2027.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
These are roadmap dates, including an estimated certification milestone. They are not completed certification, guaranteed access or an extension of EU obligations.
Evidence 1
Question for Ireland: How would Ireland label forecast milestones so readers do not mistake them for delivered services?
Read the detailed evidence for Romania (1 items)
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
RO Wallet's project page checked on 8 October schedules a test and sandbox milestone for 31 October, estimated MVP certification and a selected-group beta for 22 December 2026, and an official version 1 launch for 14 January 2027.
These are project forecasts, not completed certification, guaranteed public access or an extension of EU obligations.
Read the primary sources
- Despre proiect - RO Wallet
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: These are roadmap dates, including an estimated certification milestone. They are not completed certification, guaranteed access or an extension of EU obligations.
Slovakia
Slovakia's law separates the state's wallet responsibility from provider requirements and supervisory functions.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
MeID describes passkey login after one-time chip-document proofing; mailbox eligibility differs.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
The law assigns state wallet responsibilities to the Interior Ministry and supervisory functions to NBÚ.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
Provider rules require qualified trust-service status or a contract with a qualified provider; no executed contract is established.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Statutory responsibility, registration and oversight roles; delivered suppliers and certificates are not established.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3- What remains uncertain?
The law does not identify a delivered technical supplier, executed trust-service contract or issued wallet certificate.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland show the difference between legal accountability, technical supply and trust-service support?
Read the detailed evidence for Slovakia (4 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
MeID allows passkey login after one-time proofing with a Slovak chip document, so the card need not be presented at every later login.
This is national login. Mailbox eligibility differs, and this fact does not designate an EUDI provider.
Read the primary sources
- Detail - UPVS
Source checked 2026-10-07.
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Section 10 of Act 272/2016, in the binding consolidation effective from 1 January 2025, requires a wallet provider to be a qualified trust-service provider or show a contract with one, meet the applicable requirements and submit notification and certificate material to NBÚ. The relationship page checked on 8 October lists amendments 211/2019 and 365/2024.
This does not identify a technical supplier, executed contract or issued certificate, or complete the implementing-rule audit.
Read the primary sources
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Section 10a assigns the Interior Ministry the state's wallet-provision obligation, relying-party list, identity-data linking and validation, and specified public-source attribute roles. Section 10 separately sets wallet-provider registration tasks.
The accountable ministry is not necessarily the technical supplier. The law does not establish live endpoints or erase other issuers' rights.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: static.slov-lex.sk
Source checked 2026-10-08.
EUDI development · Law
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Sections 11–12 assign NBÚ wallet, trust-service and eID supervision, a single-contact role and specified certification, notification and oversight functions.
Those statutory roles do not establish a wallet certificate, every assessment body's identity or an operational national scheme.
Read the primary sources
- Primary document: static.slov-lex.sk
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: The law does not identify a delivered technical supplier, executed trust-service contract or issued wallet certificate.
Slovenia
Slovenia's business portal accepts state credentials alongside private Rekono and Halcom One services.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
SPOT accepts state credentials, Rekono, Halcom One and supported EU eIDs through SI-PASS.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
The guidance explains the SPOT/SI-PASS connection; a full operator map is not covered.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Rekono and Halcom One are accepted methods; some submissions still require a digital certificate.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Current EUDI delivery is not covered by this business-portal guidance.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What remains uncertain?
Acceptance is specific to that service. It does not establish qualified status for every product or EUDI wallet certification.
Evidence 1
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland make it clear when login alone is enough and when a submission also needs signing?
Read the detailed evidence for Slovenia (1 items)
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
SPOT uses SI-PASS and accepts state credentials, Rekono, Halcom One and supported EU eIDs. Some submissions still need an installed supported digital certificate.
Service acceptance is not blanket qualified status for every provider product or EUDI certification.
Read the primary sources
- Načini prijave | SPOT
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: Acceptance is specific to that service. It does not establish qualified status for every product or EUDI wallet certification.
Spain
Spain is consulting on wallet governance while maintaining several distinct national identity services.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-08. Limited coverage: one or more questions are not covered in this review.
- What can people use today?
Cl@ve and DNIe guidance describes national authentication and signing; MiDNI remote rollout remains unconfirmed here.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4- Who operates it?
The sources describe distinct government services; final wallet governance is not established by a hearing notice.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- How do private firms participate?
A current private-participation model is not covered by the selected evidence.
Not covered in this review. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of absence.- What is happening on EUDI?
Wallet-governance hearing through 13 October 2026; historical beta announcements are not current certification.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2- What remains uncertain?
Cl@ve, DNIe, MiDNI and the age-verification beta have different purposes. Historical rollout plans cannot establish that later phases have gone live.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2 · Evidence 3 · Evidence 4 · Evidence 5 · Evidence 6
Question for Ireland: Could Ireland separate authentication, signing, in-person document display and age proof in its public guidance?
Read the detailed evidence for Spain (6 items)
EUDI development · Consultation
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Spain's official notice sets a public hearing from 2 to 13 October 2026 on wallet governance and supervisory roles. It records urgent processing approved on 29 September and publication on 1 October.
The notice was refreshed on 8 October. It does not enact the attached draft's appointments or establish current wallet certification.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Cl@ve's government guidance describes a common identification, authentication and signing platform alongside DNIe and electronic certificates. It offers Cl@veMóvil and Cl@vePermanente; cloud signing uses remote personal certificates where applicable.
Supported methods vary by service. Login is not automatically an electronic signature or EUDI certification.
Read the primary sources
- Cl@ve | ¿Qué es Cl@ve?
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Advanced Cl@ve registration can be completed online with DNIe or an electronic certificate through the Tax Agency's portal, using the required document-support and contact information.
This is national enrolment guidance, not wallet issuance or guaranteed eligibility.
Read the primary sources
- Cl@ve | Registro - ¿Cómo puedo registrarme? - A través de internet con certificado electrónico o DNIe
Source checked 2026-10-08.
Historical record · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The 2 April 2025 MiDNI launch notice describes mobile DNI presentation for in-person use and plans remote identification and signing after a 12-month transition.
This is the historical launch plan. The passage of that date does not prove the remote phase went live.
Read the primary sources
- La Moncloa. DNI digital: ¿qué es y cómo activarlo? | 02/04/2025 [Prensa/Actualidad/Interior]
Source checked 2026-10-08.
Historical record · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The 1 July 2024 Cartera Digital Beta announcement outlines age-verification credentials and planned trust lists as a development project.
It does not establish current availability, delivered privacy guarantees or a certified wallet. Its old October 2027 timing statement is not adopted here.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
The Policía's DNIe portal distinguishes certificate-based authentication from electronic signing.
That functional description is not an independent certificate-chain, cryptographic or EUDI qualification audit.
Read the primary sources
- Autenticación y Firma electrónica
Source checked 2026-10-08.
What remains open: Cl@ve, DNIe, MiDNI and the age-verification beta have different purposes. Historical rollout plans cannot establish that later phases have gone live.
Sweden
Sweden's published wallet roadmap stretches from initial testing in 2026 to a certified-wallet goal in 2029.
Selected sources checked 2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08. Selected evidence only, not a complete country audit.
- What can people use today?
BankID's domestic policy describes bank customer proofing and its identity-service arrangements.
Evidence 1- Who operates it?
BankID names Finansiell ID-Teknik BID AB as operator and developer, owned by six named banks.
Evidence 1- How do private firms participate?
Banks own the BankID company and perform customer proofing according to the policy.
Evidence 1- What is happening on EUDI?
Digg's roadmap runs from 2026 testing to a 2029 certified-wallet goal; it does not change EU duties.
Evidence 1- What remains uncertain?
The roadmap is not a change to EU obligations. BankID's domestic governance and bank proofing arrangements are a separate layer.
Evidence 1 · Evidence 2
Question for Ireland: How would Ireland explain an established bank identity service separately from a new public-wallet roadmap?
Read the detailed evidence for Sweden (2 items)
EUDI development · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
Digg's roadmap, updated on 30 September 2026, schedules testing and first scheme milestones in December 2026, a broader SverigeID-based release in 2027, certification readiness in 2028 and a certified EUDI wallet goal in 2029. It says foreign certified wallets may be used earlier.
These are programme milestones, not an extension of EU duties or a national infringement finding.
Read the primary sources
- Tidplan för stegvis utveckling av digital identitetsplånbok | Digg
Source checked 2026-10-08.
National service · Source description
Selected source checked . Event dates remain separate.
BankID's policy names Finansiell ID-Teknik BID AB as operator and developer, owned by Danske, Handelsbanken, Länsförsäkringar, SEB, Skandiabanken and Swedbank. It describes banks' customer-proofing role and SPAR updates.
Those sections establish the described domestic roles, not every processing or retention practice or EUDI certification.
Read the primary sources
- BankID - Integritetspolicy BankID
Source checked 2026-10-07.
What remains open: The roadmap is not a change to EU obligations. BankID's domestic governance and bank proofing arrangements are a separate layer.
Turn the comparison into an Irish decision
Use the wallet role guide to map responsibilities, the certification guide to ask for the right evidence, and the demo checklist to test a supplier's claim.
For verified developments rather than launch promises, read the business briefings or join the briefing. MyID is independent and does not certify wallets or endorse providers.